ABSTRACT: For the network instability problem caused by trust decisions among wireless senor networks nodes (WSNs), this paper introduces an imbalance reward and punishment mechanism. The unreliable factors exist in the real networks, so this paper introduced the package loss rate to build a trust evolution model for wireless senor networks nodes based on imbalance reward and punishment mechanism. By the trust evolution model, the state of interaction of nodes is deduced. At last, through the experiment, various changes of nodes selecting strategy and the effect of the imbalance reward and punishment mechanism on the evolution of the convergence time are analyzed, and the effect of the imbalance rewards and penalties mechanism is verified by the results of the WSNs, which is a kind of node's initial trust strategy. The imbalance rewards and penalties mechanism for the evolution of the slow convergence in the model mechanism, and can reduce the initial nodes selection strategy trust ratio, which provides the theory basis for the design WSNs trust mechanism.
INTRODUCTION
Wireless network technology can be traced back to the United States Army during the Second World War in 20th century, which is used to do data transmission. In 1971, researchers at the University of Hawaii created the first wireless communication network based on packet technology, known as ALOHAnet. The development of wireless network technology began in the 1990s, and because of the large scale application of the second generation communication technology (GSM) and the popularization of WLAN, the wireless network has gradually affected the development of human society.
Since the literature [1] proposed the concept of trust management in 1996, WSNs node trust has become an important aspect of WSNs security. Literature [2] summarized the characteristics, classification methods, framework design, vulnerability analysis, attack model and countermeasures in WSNs environment, and discussed the trust management system based on WSNs.
In recent years, many scholars used the game theory to study the problem of wireless network. Literature [3] summarized the current research on the security of WSNs in different game types. Through the selfishness of the neighbor nodes in MANET, literature [4] adopted the fixed strategy and random strategy for dynamic evolution, which improve the degree of cooperation between the nodes to 100% ultimately. Literature [5] considered the influence of the network size and the node type in the evolutionary game on the cooperation among the nodes, and established the model to analyze the evolution of the nodes. Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical theory which is proposed by the biologists in 1960s. It is a product of the combination of game theory and Darwin's theory of biological evolution, which is proposed to describe the dynamic evolution of the population. Smith first proposed the concept of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in 1972 [6] , and its strong resistance to the invasion of the variant has the advantages of wide application in the field of ecology and social economics. In 1978, Taylor and Jonker introduced the concept of the replication dynamics (RD) [7] , and further expanded the research on the evolutionary game theory. RD can be used to study the convergence and stability of the dynamic evolutionary game process. Evolutionary game theory is widely used in engineering and computer science in recent years. In this paper, evolutionary game theory is applied to the trust evolution of wireless sensor networks, which is trying to build trust and defense strategies that can resist the selfish nodes. And the reward and punishment mechanism is introduced to promote trust and defense strategies for node selection. The results of these studies for trust mechanism of WSNs is designed to provide a theoretical basis.
2 EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AND WSNS NODE TRUST
Evolutionary game theory
Evolutionary game theory is a process of continuous and repeated symmetry matching in a large population. As species selected through the "survival of the fittest" rules adapt to the environment, the evolutionary game ultimately elected the stable strategy. Evolutionary game theory is different from the traditional non-cooperative game, what the game does not need is perfectly rational. Evolutionary game system theory has two important concepts, which is evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) and replication dynamics (RD). ESS and RD respectively emphasize the role of variation and selection.
Evolution stability strategy
Suppose that there is a finite pure strategy set H= {1,2,…,k}, the corresponding mixed strategy set is represented as
Assuming that individuals with X strategy and Y strategy of the individual carry out the game, the income obtained by individuals using X strategy is u(x,y). The definition of ESS is as follows [8] . ESS: For any strategy, if y ∈ Δ and y ≠ x, there is a certain εy ∈ (0, 1) which makes the inequality (1) true for all ε ∈ (0, εy), and then x ∈ Δ is an evolutionary stable strategy.
Replication dynamics
The strategies for each individual in the population come from Δ. In time t, when the proportion of the individual in the population adopting the strategy i∈H is Xi(t), the current state of the population can be defined by vector X(t)=(xi(t),…, xk(t)). The replication dynamics equation [8] is given in (2) .
u(si, x) is the average income which is obtained by using pure strategy i when the population is in x state; u(x, x) is the overall average income, that is
3 THE TRUST EVOLUTION MODEL FOR WSNS NODE BASED ON REWARD AND PUNISHMENTPAPER MECHANISM
The establishment of model
On the basis of literature [9] , this paper introduced the reward and punishment mechanism and node attack and defense behavior. L represents the loss caused by the failure of the sending packet reaching to the destination node. C represents the cost of sending or forwarding data for normal node. G1 represents the gains obtained by forwarding the data for nodes. G2 represents the gain obtained by the data packet sent by the node which is forwarded by other nodes. A represents the attack cost. D represents defense costs. a represents reward factor. B represents punishment factor. P represents packet loss rate. T represents the degree of trust.
Before the presentation of the model, this paper first makes description of the model as follows:
(1) There is a wireless network, where the nodes are divided into two categories: one is the good node, and the other one is selfish node.
(2) Good nodes have three behavior choices which are trust, distrust and defense; selfish nodes have three behavior choices which are trust, distrust and attack.
(3) The trust behavior of good nodes represents that the nodes not only send data packets, but also forward those for other nodes; the defensive behavior of good nodes represents that when the other nodes help forward the data packets, the corresponding good nodes will also help forward them for other nodes, or they are in sleep mode which means they neither forward nor send data packets; the distrust behavior of good nodes represents that the nodes only send data packets instead of forwarding them for other nodes.
(4) The trust behavior of selfish nodes represents the nodes not only send data packets, but also forward them for other nodes; the attack behavior of selfish nodes represents that the selfish nodes only send data packets instead of forwarding them for other nodes because of their selfishness; the distrust behavior of selfish nodes represents that the nodes only send data packets instead of forwarding them because of distrust, however, the cost of sending data packets is higher than that of attack behavior.
When the WSNs nodes interact, each node can choose the trust strategy, the distrust strategy, the attack strategy and the defense strategy. The data packet sent or forwarded by nodes does not always successfully reach to the destination node, which results in that the interaction of different strategies and the income between nodes are different. Different situations are discussed as follow:
(1) The two interactive nodes both choose trust During the interaction of two nodes A and B, according to the combination principle, each node has contracting and subcontracting behaviors both. And due to the unreliable factors in network, there are two results (success and failure) for each behavior. The probability and income of each event are shown in Table 1 . P represents the probability of occurrence of each event, 1 is success, and 0 is failure. 
We can get from Table 1 that the income of A and
(2) One node choose trust and the other one chooses distrust During the interaction of two nodes A and B, according to the combination principle, the node choosing trust has contracting and subcontracting behaviors both, and the other node choosing distrust only has contracting behavior. And due to the unreliable factors in network, there are two results (success and failure) for each behavior. The probability and income of each event are shown in Table 2 . Table 2 . One node choose trust and the other one chooses distrust.
We can get from Table 1 that, A's income is P
(3) One node chooses defense and the other one chooses trust
During the interaction of two nodes A and B, each node has contracting and subcontracting behaviors both. And due to the unreliable factors in network, there are two results (success and failure) for each behavior. The probability and income of each event are shown in Table 3 . Table 3 . One node chooses defense and the other one chooses trust.
We can get from Table 3 During the interaction of two nodes A and B, according to the combination principle, the node choosing defense has contracting and subcontracting behaviors both, and the node choosing distrust only has contracting behavior. And due to the unreliable factors in network, there are two results (success and failure) for each behavior. The probability and income of each event are shown in Table 4 . Table 4 . One node chooses defense and the other one chooses distrust.
We can get from Table 1 
(5) One node chooses trust and the other one chooses attack During the interaction of two nodes A and B, according to the combination principle, the node choosing trust has contracting and subcontracting behaviors both, and the other node choosing attack only has contracting behavior. And due to the unreliable factors in network, there are two results (success and failure) for each behavior. The probability and income of each event are shown in Table 5 . Table 5 . One node chooses trust and the other one chooses attack.
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We can get from Table 1 (8) The two interactive nodes both choose distrust Because two sides both choose distrust strategy, they only have contracting behavior. So the income of two sides is -C-L-bT.
So we can get the benefits matrix of two nodes from Table 6 . Table 6 . The benefits matrix of two nodes.
Evolution stable strategy and evolution analysis
Assuming that in wireless sensor networks, the proportion of the rational nodes taking the trust, distrust and defense strategies is x1, x2, x3, and that of the malicious nodes taking trust, distrust and attack strategies is y1, y2, y3, wherein x1+x2+x3=1,y1+y2+y3=1. The income matrix of rational nodes and malicious nodes is A and B. b  2  2  2  a  2  2  2  1  2   b  b  -a  1  2   b  2  2  2  b  2  2  2  a  2  2  2  1  2 According to the replication dynamics equation of evolution game theory, we can obtain the dynamic equation of the two populations: 2  2  2  3  1  2  3  3  1 3  1  1  2  3  3   2  1 3  3  3  2 3  1 3  2 3  2 3 [( 2  2  2  2  3 2 3  2  3 2 3  1 2  1   2 3  1 2  1 2  1 2  2 3 d y x y y P G x y y P L y y P G d t y y C y y bT y y aT y y PC y y A
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EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
Simulated by MARLAB 2010, the evolutionary stable theory in the game process is verified by setting different values of G1, G2, P, T, L, A, D, C, a, b.
(1) Assume G1=10, G2=8, L=2, T=10, a=0, b=0, C=10, D=12, A=8, P=0.8
When (X, Y) = (x1, x2, x3, y1, y2, y3) = (1/2, 1/2, 0, 1/3, 1/3, 1/3). The status of the wireless sensor network is shown in Figure 1 .
Simulation results in Figure 1 show that, in the absence of reward and punishment mechanism, when the rational nodes in wireless sensor network do not choose defense strategy, the malicious nodes choose the attack strategy. In order to reduce the loss, the rational nodes choose distrust strategy. After a few games, the malicious nodes choose distrust strategy to reduce their losses. The network will eventually converge to the non-cooperative state of two sides, which result in the network cannot provide services. Simulation results in Figure 2 show that, in the absence of reward and punishment mechanism, when some rational nodes in wireless sensor network take defense strategy, the malicious nodes take trust strategy to maximize their income after observation. After finding what the malicious nodes did, the rational nodes give up the defense strategy and choose trust strategy to maximize their own income. However, the malicious nodes just choose trust strategy temporarily, as long as they feel to be exploited, they will choose attack strategy to increase their income. After a period of time of the evolution of learning, the malicious nodes choose attack strategy, and the rational nodes choose the defense strategy after observing what the malicious nodes did. It ultimately makes the network be in such a cycle where the strategy is continuously alternated.
(2) Assume G1=10, G2=8, L=2, T=10, a=0.2, b=0.2, C=10, D=12, A=8, P=0.8
When (X,Y) = (x1,x2,x3,y1,y2,y3)=(1/3,1/3,1/3,1/3, 1/3,1/3). The status of the wireless sensor network is shown in Figure 3 .
Simulation results in Figure 3 show that, when the reward and punishment mechanism is added in the wireless sensor network, all nodes want obtain the maximum income, so the final network will converge that the malicious node choose trust strategy and the rational nodes choose defense strategy, so that the network can effectively avoid the attack of malicious nodes, and then provide normal service. Figure 4 shows that the reward and punishment mechanism plays a significant role, that is, through rewarding trust and defense, and punishing attack and distrust, it will be conducive for WSNs to evolve into the stable state of trust and defense, so as to protect the stability and security of the network.
(3) Assume a: G1=8, G2=6, L=3, a1=0.15, a2=0.15, b1=0.15, b2=0.15, T=10, C=10, D=12, A=8, P=0.7, X=0.5; b: G1=8, G2=6, L=3, a1=0.1, a2=0.2, b1=0.1, b2=0.2, T=10, C=10, D=12, A=8, P=0.7, X=0.5 Figure 5 . A comparative chart of the trust evolution of the hierarchical incentive mechanism and the imbalanced reward and punishment mechanism. Figure 5 shows that set the initial with 0. Figure 6 . A comparative chart of the trust evolution of the hierarchical incentive mechanism and the imbalanced reward and punishment mechanism. Figure 6 shows that when replicator dynamic (4) (5) meet X=0.68 and Y=0.5, participating nodes try to adjust their strategies through constant trial and error, and imitation. After about 8 seconds, the good nodes finally choose trust strategy. When replicator dynamic (4) (5) meet X=0.29 and Y=0.5, participating nodes try to adjust their strategies through constant trial and error, and imitation. After 17 seconds, all good nodes finally choose trust strategy. The experimental results show that in order to make all good nodes ultimately choose the trust strategy, the initial ratio of good nodes is 0.68 under the imbalanced reward and punishment mechanism, and that is 0.29 under the equal reward and punishment mechanism. As can be seen from Figure 6 , the imbalanced reward and punishment mechanism can make WSNs faster and more stable.
CONCLUSIONS
The security mechanism based on trust is one of the important security technologies in WSNs, which can help the network nodes to build confidence and reduce the cooperation risk, so as to ensure the security and stability of the whole network. In this paper, we use the evolutionary game theory to reflect the gains and losses of the participating nodes in the choice of different strategies, which can reflect the limited rationality, the non-zero-sum of the game, and the repetition of the WSNs nodes that choose defense strategy and trust strategy. Reward and punishment mechanisms with trust bind effectively reduces WSNs' requirements of ratio of node initially selecting trust strategy, and makes the WSNs be in cooperative state. The replicator dynamics equation of the WSNs game is the basis of the evolutionary stable strategy, which provides a theoretical basis for the design of the WSNs trust mechanism. 
